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ESSAY
UNPRECEDENTED?
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLES
AND THE SEARCH FOR A USABLE PAST
Josh Chafetz*
"Unprecedented" is a dirty word - at least in the context of consti-
tutional politics. The claim that some behavior is unprecedented carries
with it a distinct whiff of impermissibility: if it's never been done before,
then at the very least the burden is on those who would want to do it to
show that it is permissible. A thumb is very firmly placed on the scale
against constitutional novelty. The claim that some activity is constitu-
tionally novel is therefore a politically potent one.
Of course, to call one act a "precedent" for another is not to state a
fact about the relationship between them but rather to engage in a cre-
ative act of interpretation. Precedential relationships are made, not
found,2 and therefore charges of unprecedentedness represent a political
judgment - but one that comes in the guise of a discovery of a fact
about the world. In recent years, perhaps nowhere has unprecedented
behavior been "discovered" with more abandon than in the context of
judicial appointments. Part I of this Essay describes recent events in
this domain, beginning in the George W. Bush Administration and cul-
minating with the 2017 elimination of the filibuster for all nominees. In
particular, it focuses on the discourse surrounding these reforms, noting
that at every turn, accusations of "unprecedented" behavior have flown
in all directions and have served as justifications for countermeasures,
which are in turn characterized as unprecedented. Part II then recon-
structs two pasts - two precedential pathways - for recent events, one
drawing on the history of legislative obstruction and the other on the
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Will Baude, Mike Dorf, Joey Fishkin,
Randy Kozel, Marin Levy, David Pozen, Aziz Rana, Catherine Roach, and Justin Zaremby for
helpful and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts. The research and writing of this Essay
were funded in part by a gift from the Charles Adelman Fund at Cornell Law School. I gratefully
acknowledge the generosity of Charles Adelman and the support his gift provides to legal scholar-
ship. Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own.
1 This is notably true in that subset of constitutional politics that consists of judicial deci-
sionmaking. For instance, claims that the individual mandate imposed by the Affordable Care Act
was unprecedented did quite a bit of work in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547-58 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.); id. at 649-60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). For a cogent
attack on this principle in the context of judicial decisions, see Leah M. Litman, Debunking
Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017).
2 This observation is hardly original. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 148-59 (1930).
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history of confirmation politics. The purpose of these historical narra-
tives is not to adjudicate particular claims of unprecedentedness but
rather to highlight the ways in which any claim of (un)precedentedness
involves particular, contestable constructions of the past. The Essay
concludes with some thoughts about why we might prefer some avail-
able pasts to others.
I. THE PRESENT
By the middle of 2004, Republicans were furious. Three years into
George W. Bush's presidency, they were having at best very limited suc-
cess in stocking the federal courts, and especially the circuit courts, with
their preferred personnel. Democrats had held the Senate majority for
most of the io7 th Congress (2001-2003), and they had used their power
to good effect, confirming only 52% of Bush's 4 nominees to the courts
of appeals.5 But Republicans retook the Senate in the 2002 midterms
and clearly expected the pace of appointments to pick up. Orrin Hatch,
who became chair of the Judiciary Committee, announced that he would
dial down the deference traditionally given to home-state senators, hold-
ing hearings and votes even for nominees opposed by both home-state
senators.6 Of the seven appeals-court nominees in that Congress who
did not have the approvals of both home-state senators, five were voted
out of committee.7  Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the
Judiciary Committee, solemnly intoned that this move would "be long
remembered in the annals of the Senate and of our committee for the
precedent set by [holding a hearing on a nominee over the objection of
Republicans controlled the Senate between January 20 and June 6, 2001, but after Senator
James Jeffords began caucusing with the Democrats, the Democrats controlled the chamber for the
rest of the io 7 th Congress. See Josh Chafetz, A Fourth Way? Bringing Politics Back into Recess
Appointments (And the Rest of the Separation of Powers, Too), 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 16I, 170
n.39 (2015).
4 Given the frequency with which Presidents, members of Congress, and judges are mentioned,
this Essay purposefully deviates from the Harvard Law Review's custom of using the titles of all
political officeholders whenever they are mentioned.
Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 905 tbl.2 (2005). Throughout, following the Goldman article
series, I use "courts of appeals" to refer to the courts of appeals of general jurisdiction - that is, to
exclude the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. For the Io7th Congress in particular, this
tally also omits the eight nominees submitted by President Clinton at the beginning of the Congress
and withdrawn by President Bush two months later. See S. REP. No. 108-152, at 22-26 (2003)
(listing the names of the withdrawn nominees).
6 See Mitchel A. Sollenberger, The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government,
gy9g-2009,37 CONGRESS& PRESIDENCY 125, 143-46 (2010). On the tradition of senatorial cour-
tesy and blue slips generally, see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 126 (2017).
7 Sollenberger, supra note 6, at 144 tbl.2.
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both home-state senators], for the hubris behind it and for the brazen-
ness of the double standard it sets."8 Majority Leader Bill Frist was
unmoved; when the nominees came to the floor, he declined to honor
hold requests on them.9 Democrats responded by increasing the use of
filibusters against those, and other, nominees. 10 None of the nominees
lacking the support of their home-state senators were confirmed in that
Congress." In the end, the Republicans' record in the io8th Congress
was no better than in the io7 th: 53% of Bush's nominees to the circuit
courts were confirmed. 12 (It should be noted that the confirmation of
district judges was significantly less contentious, with 85% and go% of
nominees confirmed in the io7 th and io8th Congresses, respectively.1 3
One Democratic Senate aide during this period suggested that this was
evidence of Democrats' "pick[ing] their fights" - that is, holding their
fire for the more ideologically freighted appellate nominees. 14)
Of the sixteen failed court-of- appeals nominations in the io8th
Congress, ten involved at least one failed cloture vote on the Senate
floor - in other words, the nominations failed because a filibuster could
not be broken.1 5 Several involved multiple failed cloture votes: for in-
stance, backers attempted to invoke cloture on Miguel Estrada's nomi-
nation to the D.C. Circuit on seven occasions between March and July
2003, but none of those attempts received more than fifty-five votes in
favor, and his nomination was withdrawn in September of that year.16
The remaining six nominees were never brought to the floor at all. 7
In this context, President Bush decided to heighten the conflict. De-
claring that "a minority of Democratic Senators has been using unprec-
edented obstructionist tactics to prevent . . . qualified individuals from
receiving up-or-down votes,"" Bush recess appointed Charles Pickering
to the Fifth Circuit in January 2004 and William Pryor to the Eleventh
8 Sarah Kellogg, Levin, Stabenow Objections to Judge Ignored, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July
31, 2003, at A22.
9 Sollenberger, supra note 6, at 146.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 144 tbl.2.
12 Goldman, supra note 5, at 905 tbl.2.
1 Id. at 904 tbl.i.
14 Sheldon Goldman et al., W Bush's Judiciary: The First Term Record, 88 JUDICATURE 244,
257 (2005) (quoting "an aide to a senior Democratic senator on the Judiciary Committee").
1 See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 3 1868, U.S. CIRCUIT
AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH DURING THE
Io7TH-IogTH CONGRESSES app. 3, at 54-60 (2007).
16 See id. at 54-55.
17 See id. at 54-60.
18 Statement on the Recess Appointment of Charles W. Pickering to Serve on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. gi (Jan. 16, 2004).
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Circuit in February 20041'9 - each of whose nominations had fallen to
a filibuster earlier in the same Congress. 20 (Pickering had also been
nominated in the io7 th Congress but had not been reported out of com-
mittee. 21) Majority Leader Frist echoed the President's language, as-
serting that the recess appointments were the "proper response to un-
precedented obstructionism." 2 2 Minority Leader Tom Daschle, on the
other hand, insisted in a floor speech that it was the White House that
was flouting established political norms:
In spite of the Senate's judgment, the President has chosen to take the
unprecedented step of using recess appointments to bypass the Senate on
two occasions. . . . At no point has a President ever used a recess appoint-
ment to install a rejected nominee on to the Federal bench. . . . This White
House is insisting on a radical departure from historic and constitutional
practices.23
He called on the White House to offer "assurances that it will no longer
abuse the process and that it will once again respect our Constitution's
essential system of checks and balances"; 24 when that reassurance was
not forthcoming, he announced that Democrats would shut down the
judicial confirmation process entirely "until we are given the assurance
that they will not recess appoint future judges, especially judges who
have been rejected by the Senate." 25 The White House rejected the offer,
citing the need to use recess appointments in the face of "unprecedented
Democratic obstructionism. '"2 6
After about a month and a half, a deal was reached: The White
House foreswore recess appointments of judges for the remainder of the
Congress, and Senate Democrats agreed to allow a floor vote on twenty-
five nominees (twenty for district courts and five for courts of appeals).
The deal specified, however, that a number of other nominees, including
Pryor and Pickering, would not be brought to the floor.27
In November of that year, Bush was reelected, and Republicans
gained four Senate seats, giving them a total of fifty-five. Within days
of the election, Frist announced that, "[o]ne way or another, the filibuster
19 Id.; Statement on the Appointment of William H. Pryor, Jr., to Serve on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 259 (Feb. 20, 2004).
20 RUTKUS ET AL., supra note 15, app. 3, at 57-58.
21 Id. app. 2, at 48.
22 Richard B. Schmitt & Richard Simon, In Rare Move, Bush Installs Judge Pickering, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at Ag.
23 150 CONG. REC. 5369 (2004).
24 Id.
25 Thomas Ferraro, Daschle Vows to Block All Bush Judicial Nominees, REUTERS, Mar. 30,
2004.
26 Id.
27 Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse Over Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at
Aig.
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of judicial nominees must end" in the next Congress. 2 8  As the new
Congress convened, Frist expanded upon what he meant:
[I]n the last Congress I believe the Senate failed to perform an essential
constitutional duty. It failed to offer advice and consent to the President by
filibustering ten judicial nominees and threatening to filibuster another six.
These filibusters were unprecedented. Never in the history of the Senate
has a minority filibustered a judicial nominee who had clear majority sup-
port. This was an abrupt and an unfortunate break in more than 200 years
of Senate tradition, of Senate history. This tradition must be restored, not
merely because we honor the traditions of the Senate, but because this tra-
dition reflects the proper role for this body, the Senate, as designed by our
Framers in the constitutional arrangement. 29
If Democrats would not go along, he threatened, it would become nec-
essary to "change Senate procedures."3 0 Frist was threatening to invoke
what was variably called either the "nuclear option" or the "constitu-
tional option." In brief, this would involve either (a) the chair ruling
that cloture on a nomination was achieved by majority vote with that
ruling upheld by majority vote on the floor, or (b) the chair ruling that
cloture on a nomination required a supermajority vote with that ruling
overturned by majority vote on the floor. The (at least implicit) theory
behind either ruling would be that an absolute minority veto would vi-
olate a structural constitutional principle of majority rule within a house
of Congress.3 1  In making this threat - and in decrying Democratic
obstruction as unprecedented - Frist had significant support from con-
servative media elites. 3 2 Democrats, in turn, depicted the threat as a
dangerous innovation. In the words of Senator Chuck Schumer, "[flor
28 Carl Hulse, Frist Warns on Filibusters Over Bush Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at A2 1.
29 151 CONG. REC. 14 (2005).
30 Id.
31 For a brief discussion of the potential mechanics of the nuclear/constitutional option - ad-
vanced in 2004 by a former Frist staffer - see Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional
Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster,
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 260-61 (2004). For one version of the argument that the filibuster
is unconstitutional, see Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1003, ioii-i6 (2011).
32 See, e.g., Jay Ambrose, GOP Shouldn't Fear Nuclear Option for Dems' Filibustering Ways,
ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Nov. 20, 2004, at C4 ("If Democrats in the Senate continue their un-
precedented, unconstitutional, undemocratic, unconscionable tactic of using filibusters to prevent
up-or-down floor votes on President Bush's judicial nominees, do not hesitate. Blast their republic-
harming impudence to smithereens."); Gary J. Andres, Majority Rule on Judges; 'Nuclear Option'
is Nothing New, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A2 3 ("Republican leaders are simply demanding
the restoration of the status quo in the confirmation process. Labels like 'nuclear option' imply
major, unprecedented and pre-emptive actions by Senate Republicans. Not true. It's the Demo-
crats' tactics, filibustering and denying confirmation to majority-supported appellate court nomi-
nees, that is 'unprecedented' and 'pre-emptive."'); Morton Kondracke, Dems Look Like the Ex-
tremists Here, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at 47 ("If 'nuclear war' befalls the Senate, the blame
falls first on Democrats for abandoning normal procedure - full debate - and resorting to the
filibuster to block Bush's nominations.").
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the sake of country and some degree of comity, I would hope and pray
that the majority leader would not take away the Senate's time-honored,
200-year-old tradition."3 3
Several nominees, including Pickering, asked not to have their nom-
inations resubmitted in the iogth Congress. 34 But Bush opted to re-
nominate twelve circuit court nominees who had not been confirmed in
the previous Congress, including Pryor and several others who had been
held up as part of the deal the previous year.3 5 When the renominations
were announced, White House press secretary Scott McClellan said in
a statement that "[tihe Senate has a constitutional obligation to vote up
or down on a president's judicial nominees."3 6 This appeared to set up
a showdown: Democrats' professed views that these specific nominees
were sufficiently unfit for judicial office as to warrant a filibuster came
squarely into conflict with Republicans' willingness to use majoritarian
means of eliminating the filibuster. The conflict was averted at the last
minute in late May 2005, when a group of seven Democrats and seven
Republicans went around both parties' leadership and reached an agree-
ment to allow several Bush nominees to come to the floor, while pre-
serving the filibuster.3 7 More precisely, the Democrats on the Gang of
Fourteen, as it came to be known, agreed for the remainder of the logth
Congress to vote for cloture on judicial nominees except in (undefined)
"extraordinary circumstances," and the Republicans agreed to vote
against an attempt to lower the cloture threshold for nominees. 38
Frist was displeased. He announced that he and the rest of the ma-
jority leadership had "decided to stand for [the] principle . . . [that e]very
judicial nominee brought to the floor shall get a fair up-or-down vote."39
He insisted that:
The proper term for our response is the "constitutional option" because
we would rely on the Constitution's power of self-governance to restore
Senate traditions barring judicial filibusters. Against their unprecedented
power grab by filibuster - that is what I would call the nuclear option -
there is only one antidote that is certain, that would absolutely be effective,
and that is the constitutional option.40
33 Hulse, supra note 28.
34 Neil A. Lewis, Bush Tries Again on Court Choices Stalled in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2004, at Ai (noting that Pickering, Carolyn Kuhl, and Claude Allen declined to be renominated).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees: Senators
Agree on Votesfor 3; 2 Could Still Face Filibusters, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at Ai.
8 Id.
39 151 CONG. REC. 11,105 (2005).
40 Id. at ii,io6.
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The Gang of Fourteen agreement, Frist added, "stops far short of the
principle on which this leadership stands." 4 1  Schumer, on the other
hand, celebrated the agreement: "Our robust system of checks and bal-
ances has been saved from an unprecedented attack" - that is, the po-
tential abolition of the filibuster.4 2 The agreement quickly resulted in
the confirmations of Janice Rogers Brown to the D.C. Circuit, Priscilla
Owen to the Fifth Circuit, and William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit,4 3
but its systemic impact was modest: the ogth Congress saw the rate of
confirmation to appellate judgeships tick up to 56%.44 The logth
Congress also saw the confirmations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito
to the Supreme Court. While Roberts was confirmed by a vote of sev-
enty-eight to twenty-two, Alito was confirmed by a much narrower vote
of fifty-eight to forty-two. 4 5 However, cloture was invoked on the Alito
nomination by a vote of seventy-two to twenty-five. 4 6  All seven
Democrats in the Gang of Fourteen voted for cloture, 47 but only two of
them voted to confirm Alito. 4 8
In the context of abysmal approval ratings for President Bush,
Democrats retook control of both houses of Congress after the 2006 elec-
tions, 4 9 meaning that a minority filibuster was no longer the President's
principal concern when it came to confirming judges. In the iioth
Congress, only 43% of Bush's nominees to the circuit courts were con-
firmed.5 0  The 2008 elections were also good for the Democrats, with
41 Id. Conservative media were also unimpressed. A story in the Washington Times ended with
this masterpiece of snark: "Mr. McCain, a chief architect of the deal ... had to leave the press
conference before it ended to make an early screening of a movie about himself." Charles Hurt, 7
Republicans Abandon GOP on Filibuster: Reid Hails Party 'Victory'; Bolters Preserve Old Rule,
WASH. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at Ai.
42 151 CONG. REC. 11,110 (2005).
43 Sheldon Goldman et al., Picking Judges in a Time of Turmoil: W Bush's Judiciary During the
iopth Congress, go JUDICATURE 252, 265 (2007).
44 Goldman and his coauthors put it at 58%, Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama's First Term Judi-
ciary: Picking Judges in the Minefield of Obstructionism, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 8 tbl.i (2013), but
they appear to have missed one unconfirmed nominee. They count twenty-six nominees, whereas
there were in fact twenty-seven. See S. REP. No. 109-369, at 122-24 tbl.G (2006) (listing twenty-
eight nominees, one of whom - Kimberly Ann Moore - was a Federal Circuit nominee and thus
omitted from both of our tallies).
45 Goldman et al., supra note 43, at 271.
46 152 CONG. REC. 317-18 (2006).
47 Compare the cloture vote at id. with the Gang of Fourteen membership in Hurt, supra note
41.
48 Those two were Robert Byrd and Ben Nelson. Compare the confirmation vote at 152 CONG.
REC. 361 (2006), with the Gang of Fourteen membership in Hurt, supra note 41.
49 John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at Ai.
5o Goldman and his coauthors put it at 46%, Goldman et al., supra note 44, at 8 tbl.i, but they
appear to have missed one unconfirmed nominee. They count twenty-two nominees, whereas there
were in fact twenty-three. See S. REP. No. III-II, at 32-34 (2009) (listing twenty-four nominees,
one of whom - Rod Rosenstein - is mistakenly listed twice).
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Barack Obama winning the presidency and the party significantly in-
creasing its margins in both chambers.5 1 Indeed, for several months of
the iiith Congress, Democrats had a filibuster-proof majority, if the
entire caucus held together.5 2 And Obama secured the confirmation of
68% of his circuit court nominees in that Congress, a significantly higher
percentage than was achieved at any point during the Bush Administra-
tion.5 3  Moreover, both Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan were con-
firmed to the Supreme Court with sixty-eight and sixty-three votes,
respectively.54
But the smooth sailing was not to last: After what Obama referred
to as the Democrats' "shellacking" in the 2010 midterm elections,5 5 their
Senate margin was much reduced in the 112th Congress, and the con-
firmation rate for circuit judges dropped back to 57%.56 Moreover,
Republicans increasingly drew out each confirmation process by deny-
ing unanimous consent, leading to what some academic observers de-
scribed as "unprecedented obstruction and delay." 5 7 Indeed, in the con-
text of nonjudicial appointments, the Administration got so fed up58
that, in January 2012, Obama unilaterally declared the Senate to be in
recess, the chamber's convening of pro forma sessions notwithstanding,
so as to make recess appointments to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).5 9
1 David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Widen Their Senate Edge to a Solid Majority, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5,2008, at P12; Carl Hulse, Democrats Increase Their Strength in the House, but Lose
Some Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Pi 3 .
52 Democrats' sixtieth seat came when Al Franken was seated in July 2009, after a lengthy and
litigated recount process. See Carl Hulse, What's So Super About a Supermajority?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2009, at Ai 3 . It also would not have come about had Arlen Specter not left the Republican
Party and become a Democrat. See Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Specter Switches Parties;
More Heft for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at Ai. Democrats lost the filibuster-proof
edge in February 2010 when Republican Scott Brown won the seat previously held by Ted Kennedy.
See Carl Hulse & Jeff Zeleny, G.O.P Senator Is Sworn In, and Democrats Regroup, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2010, at AI4.
53 Goldman et al., supra note 44, at 8 tbl.i.
54 S. REP. No. 112-5, at 37-38 (2011).
5 Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, The Great Divide: Obama and G.O.P, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
at Ai.
56 Goldman et al., supra note 44, at 8 tbl.i.
5 Id. at 26.
8 Democrats naturally condemned the obstruction of the executive nominees as unprecedented.
See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 19,185 (2011) (statement of Majority Leader Reid) ("This is the first time
in the Senate's history that a party has blocked a qualified candidate solely because they disagreed
with the existence of an agency that has been created by law."); id. at 19,187 (statement of Sen.
Johnson) ("Due to an unprecedented and irresponsible display of political gamesmanship, Mr.
Cordray's nomination and strong protections for American consumers are being held hostage.").
59 For a brief summary of the facts, see Ryan D. Doerfler, Go Big or Go Home: The Constitu-
tionality of Recess Appointments Following Pro Forma Sessions of the Senate, 65 ADMIN. L. REV.
975, 976-79 (2013). See also CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 298-99 (noting that congressional obstruc-
tion in this context encouraged and justified executive aggrandizement).
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House Speaker John Boehner called the move "an extraordinary and
entirely unprecedented power grab . . . that defies centuries of prac-
tice ... [and] would have a devastating effect on the checks and bal-
ances that are enshrined in our Constitution." 6 0 On the constitutional
point, the Supreme Court would at least partially agree, invalidating
these appointments in June 2014.61 In the shorter term, some Republi-
cans used the recess appointments as a justification for increased ob-
structionism on judicial nominees. As Senator Jim DeMint put it,
"[u]nless he revokes his unprecedented recess appointments that defied
the constitutional role of Congress, I don't intend to support any of his
judicial nominees this year." 62
In November 2012, Obama was reelected, and Democrats added to
their Senate margin, but they were still well shy of sixty votes.63 Con-
firmation battles came to the fore almost immediately. Although some
circuit judges were confirmed in the opening months of the new
Congress, 64 a number of others were held up. Especially upsetting to
Democrats was Republicans' refusal to consider three judges nominated
to the D.C. Circuit; Republicans asserted that Obama was trying to
"pack" the court.65 Republicans also filibustered a number of nominees
to executive and independent agencies, including several at the cabinet
level and those whom Obama had recess appointed in the previous
Congress. 66 By July 2013, Majority Leader Harry Reid was prepared
to eliminate the filibuster for executive and independent agencies by
majority vote.67 Minority Leader Mitch McConnell declared the threat
to be "a very sad day for the Senate. If we do not pull back from the
brink, my friend the majority leader is going to be remembered as the
worst leader of the Senate ever, the leader of the Senate who fundamen-
tally changed the body."68 Senator Jeff Sessions explicitly linked Repub-
lican opposition to the recess appointments: "We shouldn't sit here and
60 Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at Ai.
61 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). For a discussion of the use of historical
precedent in Noel Canning, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice,
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. I.
62 Editorial, Obama's Last-Ditch Appointments; Harry Reid Moves to Stack the Judiciary,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at B2.
63 Nicholas Confessore & Jess Bidgood, Back to Work: Obama Greeted by Looming Fiscal Crisis:
Little to Show for Cash Flood by Big Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at Ai.
64 See S. REP. No. 114-1o, at 40-44 (2015) [hereinafter 113 REPORT] (noting the confirmation
of six circuit judges between February and July 2013).
65 David G. Savage & Kathleen Hennessey, Obama Challenges GOP on Court Appointees, L.A.
TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A 7 .66 Jeremy W. Peters, Democrats Plan Attack on G.O.P Filibuster Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2013,
at Ai.
67 Id.
68 159 CONG. REC. S5654 (daily ed. July 11, 2013).
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go quietly when the President of the United States - without any legal
basis, in my opinion - makes a recess appointment to avoid the confir-
mation process, and now we object to these people being confirmed after
they were in office."6 9 At the last minute, a deal was struck: Republicans
would allow votes on seven nominees, including the CFPB nominee who
had been recess appointed; Democrats would withdraw the nominations
of the two NLRB recess appointees and substitute in their stead two
others, who would receive floor votes; and Democrats would not elimi-
nate the filibuster.7 0 The New York Times reported on the deal's warm
afterglow: "Though the agreement did nothing to change or save the
filibuster in the future, negotiators insisted the deal - and the difficult
process that created it - would have far-reaching ramifications in re-
storing comity and cooperation in the Senate and could create an atmos-
phere for reaching larger legislative agreements." 7 1
That optimism dissipated quickly.7 2 Republicans maintained their
filibusters of judicial nominees - their "continued run of unprecedented
obstructionism," in Reid's words 7 3 - and Democrats soon grew fed up.
On November 21, 2013, they finally went "nuclear": declaring that
Congress "has wasted an unprecedented amount of time on procedural
hurdles and partisan obstruction,"7 4 Reid raised a point of order that
"the vote on cloture under rule XXII for all nominations other than for
the Supreme Court of the United States is by majority vote."7 5 Senator
Leahy in the chair ruled against him, at which point Reid appealed the
ruling to the floor, where it was overturned by a vote of fifty-two to
forty-eight (including Leahy voting to overrule himself).7 6 It was thus
established as an authoritative interpretation of the Senate rules that
cloture on all non-Supreme Court nominations was by simple majority.
Cloture was then invoked on Patricia Millett's nomination to the D.C.
Circuit by a vote of fifty-five to forty-three,7 7 and she was confirmed by
a vote of fifty-six to thirty-eight. 7,
69 Id. at S5658.
70 Jonathan Weisman & Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Strikes Filibuster Deal, Ending Logjam on
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at Ai.
71 Id.
72 Indeed, Republicans were complaining within a couple of days. See Jonathan Weisman &
Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Confirms Nominees as G.O.P Discontent Rises, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2013, at Ai 4 .3 Michael A. Memoli, Senate GOP Blocks Obama Picks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. I, 2013, at Ai.
74 159 CONG. REC. S8414 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (statement of Sen. Reid); see also id. ("Con-
sistent and unprecedented obstruction by the Republican Caucus has turned 'advise and consent'
into 'deny and obstruct."').
7 Id. at S8 4 17.
76 Id. at S8417-18.
77 Id. at S8 4 18.
78 Id. at S8 5 84 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2013).
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Heralding the move, Obama noted that it came in response to "an
unprecedented pattern of obstruction in Congress that's prevented too
much of the American people's business from getting done." 9 Sessions
had a somewhat different take, declaring that it constituted "the greatest
alteration of the rules without proper procedure that we have probably
seen in the history of the Republic." 0 Senator Lamar Alexander echoed
the point: "This action by the Democratic majority is the most important
and most dangerous restructuring of the rules of the Senate since
Thomas Jefferson wrote the rules at the founding of our country" 1 As
a result of the rules change, judicial confirmation rates shot up: in the
II3 th Congress, 91% of circuit nominees were confirmed.
8 2 It was only
after the elimination of the filibuster for non-Supreme Court nominees
that Democratic appointees began to dominate most of the circuits. 3
In the 2014 elections, Republicans retook the Senate.8 4 In the context
of the heightened tensions over judicial nominees, they were not inclined
to cooperate with the Administration. Undoubtedly aware of this,
Obama barely bothered to put forward any nominees for the circuit
courts. Of the eight nominees to the courts of appeals in the ii 4 th
Congress, only one was confirmed (Luis Felipe Restrepo, to the Third
Circuit). 5  District court confirmations dropped off as well, although
not quite so starkly: of the sixty-three nominees to the trial courts, eight-
een were confirmed, for a confirmation rate of 29%.6 The most con-
tentious confirmation battle, of course, came with the Supreme Court
vacancy that unexpectedly arose in February 2Q16.
On February 13, Justice Scalia passed away. That same day, both
Majority Leader McConnell and Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck
Grassley announced their view that the next President - that is, the
winner of the 2016 election - should nominate Scalia's replacement.
Both framed their position in terms of letting "the American people"
79 Remarks on the Procedural Rule Changes in the Senate, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 795,
at i (Nov. 21, 2013).
80 159 CONG. REC. S8425 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013).
81 Id.
82 See 113 REPORT, supra note 64, at 40-44; see also Anne Joseph O'Connell, Shortening Agency
and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and
Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1680-81 (2015) (noting that filibuster reform "does
seem to have uniformly aided judicial nominations: fewer were returned to (or withdrawn by) the
President, and successful nominations came more quickly").
83 See Jeremy W. Peters, Eye on Legacy, Obama Shapes Appeals Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2014, at Ai ("Democratic appointees who hear cases full time now hold a majority of seats on nine
of the 13 United States Courts of Appeals. When Mr. Obama took office, only one of those courts
had more full-time judges nominated by a Democrat.").
84 Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Democratic Seats Fall in Seven States - Repudiation
of President Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at Ai.
85 S. REP. No. 115-19, at 25-26 (2017) [hereinafter 114 REPORT].
86 Id. at 2 6-33.
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have a say in selecting the new Justice. 7  Democrats, naturally, were
incensed. In the words of Minority Leader Reid, "[i]t would be unprec-
edented in recent history for the Supreme Court to go a year with a
vacant seat. Failing to fill this vacancy would be a shameful abdication
of one of the Senate's most essential Constitutional responsibilities." 8
Vice President - and therefore President of the Senate - Joe Biden
insisted that:
[S]aying nothing, seeing nothing, reading nothing, hearing nothing and de-
ciding in advance simply to turn your back before the president even names
a nominee is not an option the Constitution leaves open. It's a plain abdi-
cation of the Senate's solemn constitutional duty. It's an abdication, quite
frankly, that has never occurred before in our history. 9
Some scholars concurred in the judgment; in their particularly detailed
treatment, Robin Kar and Jason Mazzone concluded that:
The historical rule that best accounts for the entire history of Supreme
Court appointments is ... the following: ... the Senate may only deliber-
ately transfer one President's Supreme Court appointment powers to an un-
known successor - as Senate Republicans are currently attempting to do
with their plan - if there are contemporaneous questions about the status
of the nominating President as the most recently elected President.9o
Obama attempted to neutralize some opposition by nominating Mer-
rick Garland, a D.C. Circuit judge who was respected on both sides of
the aisle.9 1 Perhaps more importantly, at age sixty-three, Garland's ten-
ure on the Court would likely have been comparatively short. 92 Both
parties made attempts to use the vacancy and the Garland nomination
as cudgels in the 2016 presidential, and especially senatorial, elections,9 3
which had the effect of increasing the issue's salience. 94 Perhaps be-
cause the Court was generally a higher priority for Republican voters
87 Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replace-
ment Under Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 9:56 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2oI6/o2/
mitch-mcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248 [https://perma.cc/9F2 G-HS7 G].
88 Id.
89 Vice President Joe Biden, Remarks at Georgetown Law School About the Supreme Court
Nomination, POL. TRANSCRIPT WIRE, Mar. 24, 2016, ProQuest, Doc. No. 175500680.
90 Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution
Really Say About President Obama's Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U.
L. REV. ONLINE 53, 6o (2016).
91 See Eugene Scott, Republicans Have Repeatedly Praised Merrick Garland, CNN (Mar. 16,
2016, 5:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/I-6/politics/merrick-garland-republicans-praise/
index.html [https://perma.cc/L63Z-KHUQ].
92 See Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Pick Engages Supreme Court Battle: Centrist Appellate
Judge Is Named - G.O.P Leaders Refuse to Budge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. If , 2016, at Ai.
93 See Nora Kelly, How the Supreme Court Fight Followed Senators Home, THE ATLANTIC
(May 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20oi6/os/supreme-court-garland-
senate/481-122/ [https://perma.cc/8AgV-35CW].
94 See Ariel Edwards-Levy, Voters Say Economy, Supreme Court, Are Top Campaign Issues,
HUFFPOST (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/economy-supreme-court-
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than for Democrats,9 5 the Republican caucus held firm, and Garland's
nomination was returned to the President at the conclusion of the i i 4 th
Congress.9 6 Michael Gerhardt and Richard Painter described the block-
ing of Garland's nomination as breaking "the patterns of more than loo
years in which the Senate held confirmation hearings for all but two
Supreme Court nominees (who had withdrawn their nominations prior
to their hearings) and of the Senate's approving every Supreme Court
nominee who had strong professional credentials and a judicial ideology
within the mainstream of American constitutional law."9 7
The 2016 elections shocked most political observers: not only did
Republicans retain control of both houses of Congress, but Donald
Trump defeated Hillary Clinton to become President.98 This meant, of
course, that Trump would enter office with a Supreme Court vacancy
to fill, but it remained the case that, at least under the terms of the 2013
filibuster reform, cloture on Supreme Court nominees required sixty
votes. Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch, a conservative Tenth Circuit
judge who had been on a list of potential nominees Trump had released
during the campaign.99 But even before Trump announced his pick,
some Democrats came out in opposition: Senator Jeff Merkley said that
he would filibuster any nominee other than Garland, because "[tihis is a
stolen seat. This is the first time a Senate majority has stolen a seat."100
After the nomination was announced, Senator Elizabeth Warren also
used the "unprecedented blockade of Judge Merrick Garland's nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court" as part of her rationale for opposing
campaign-issues-poll-us_.57ae4804e4bo69e7e5057496 [https://perma.cc/8JSU-gRgv] (noting the
"dramatic uptick" in the number of voters identifying the future of the Supreme Court as a top
election issue between February and August 2016).
95 Id.
96 114 REPORT, supra note 85, at 25.97 Michael J. Gerhardt & Richard W. Painter, Majority Rule and the Future of Judicial Selec-
tion, 2017 Wis. L. REV. 263, 266-67; see also id. at 266 (describing "Senate Republican's [sic] ... re-
fusal to act on Judge Garland's nomination" as "unprecedented"); id. at 267 (claiming that recent
"Senate obstruction of judicial nominations" more broadly is "unprecedented").
98 Patrick Healy & Jeremy W. Peters, Democrats, Students and Foreign Allies Face the Reality
of a Trump Presidency: Grief and Glee as an Administration Once Unthinkable Takes Shape, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2016, at Ai.
99 Michael A. Memoli, A Conservative Choice: Trump Nominates Federal Judge Neil Gorsuch to
Fill the Supreme Court Seat Left Vacant by Scalia Nearly a Year Ago, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2017, at
Ai. For the Trump campaign's list of potential nominees, see Richard Wolf, Trump's Supreme Court
Choices: Reliably Right, USA TODAY, Dec. I, 2016, at Ai.
100 Burgess Everett, Senate Dems Will Filibuster Trump's Supreme Court Nominee, POLITICO
(Jan. 30, 2017, 3:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2o7/0/senate-democrats-filibuster-
supreme-court-pick-234368 [https://perma.cc/CA54-JY5A].
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Gorsuch,10 1 a position echoed by other Democratic senators, 10 2 liberal
editorialists,1 0 3 and some scholars. 1 0 4  On the other side of the aisle,
Majority Leader McConnell insisted that "oppos[ing] cloture on a parti-
san basis to kill a Supreme Court nominee never happened before in
history, in the whole history of the country."1 0 5  Senator John Cornyn
echoed that "a partisan filibuster of a Supreme Court nominee" was "un-
precedented in American history."1 0 6  Trump publicly urged Senate
Republicans to "go nuclear" if Democrats filibustered.1 0 7 Democrats did
indeed filibuster,108 and Republicans (arguing again, in McConnell's
words, that "our Democratic colleagues have done something today that
is unprecedented in the history of the Senate"109 ) took the opportunity
to lower the cloture threshold for Supreme Court nominees to a bare
majority,110 completing the move that Democrats had begun in 2013.1
Gorsuch was confirmed by a vote of fifty-four to forty-five. 112
Minority Leader Schumer described the lowering of the cloture
threshold as "the end of a long history of consensus on Supreme Court
nominations."11 3 Majority Leader McConnell, for his part, insisted that
101 Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Gorsuch, His Principles Don't Belong on the Supreme Court,
Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 20, 2017, at Ag.
102 See, e.g., Jim Brunner, Sen. Murray to Vote Against Gorsuch, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 25,
2017, at Bi; Craig Gilbert, Baldwin Will Vote No on Court Nominee, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL,
Feb. 3, 2017, at AS.
103 See, e.g., James Downie, Opinion, Yes, Democrats Should Filibuster Gorsuch. His Record
Shows Why., WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2017, at A21 ("The Republican theft of the Supreme Court
proceeded apace this week. By any rational measure, we should be in the middle of Merrick
Garland's first year on the court. Republicans' unprecedented refusal to even give Garland a con-
firmation hearing would be reason enough for Democrats to filibuster President Trump's nominee,
Neil Gorsuch.").
104 See, e.g., J. Stephen Clark, President-Shopping for a New Scalia: The Illegitimacy of
"McConnell Majorities" in Supreme Court Decision-Making, 80 ALBANY L. REV. 743, 743 (2017)
(arguing that Democrats should not "accept the legitimacy" of any decisions in which Gorsuch is
the deciding vote); see also id. at 8o6 ("Justice Gorsuch ... owes his commission to unprecedented
ideological manipulation of the appointments process.").
105 Meet the Press - April 2, 2017, NBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2017, 12:09 PM) http://www.nbcnews.
com/meet-the-press/meet-press-april-2-2017-n741-771 [https://perma.cc/PFX4-59VK].
106 Face the Nation Transcript April 2, 2017: Haley, Cornyn, King, CBS NEWS (Apr. 2, 2017,
2:09 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcript-april-2-2017-haley-cornyn-
king/ [https://perma.cc/YS5V-2AXZ].
107 Sean Sullivan et al., As Gorsuch Makes Rounds, Trump Talks "Nuclear" Tactics, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2017, at A4.
108 See 163 CONG. REC. S2 3 89 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2017) (defeating cloture on the Gorsuch nomi-
nation by a 55-45 vote).
109 Id.
110 Id. at S2 3 89-90 (overturning the ruling of the chair by a vote of 52-48 and subsequently
invoking cloture on the Gorsuch nomination by a vote of 55-45).
I See Josh Chafetz, The Supreme Court Filibuster Died Long Before the GOP Killed It, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 2017, at Bi (arguing that the 2013 exemption of Supreme Court nominees from ma-
jority cloture was highly unstable and therefore that the 2017 ruling was close to inevitable).
112 163 CONG. REC. S2442-4 3 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2017).
113 Id. at S2 3 88 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2017).
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the rules reform had reached its conclusion: "I don't think the legislative
filibuster is in danger . . . . There is not a single senator from the ma-
jority who thinks we ought to change the legislative filibuster."1 1 4
Within weeks, the President was tweeting in favor of eliminating the
legislative filibuster: "The U.S. Senate should switch to 511 votes, imme-
diately, and get Healthcare and TAX CUTS approved, fast and easy.
Dems would do it, no doubt! [sic all]" 1 5
The one constant in each of these conflicts is that each side claims
that the other has behaved in an unprecedented manner or forced the
nation into an unprecedented situation. That claim then serves to jus-
tify some response, which in turn gets characterized as unprece-
dented.11 6  Indeed, the term "unprecedented," along with a few nearly
synonymous phrases ("never before in the nation's history," "defies cen-
turies of practice," "violates a two-hundred-year-old tradition," etc.),
arises with such frequency that it takes on an almost ritualistic charac-
ter. The actual content of the claim fades into the background: Are the
events of the last decade and a half really so extraordinary as to be in-
capable of assimilation into the arc of American constitutional develop-
ment? What would count as precedent for these events, anyway? And
if claims of unprecedentedness are made with such lulling regularity any
time there is legislative procedural maneuvering, does the past have any
utility for us at all?
II. THE PASTS
Any attempt to understand claims of unprecedented behavior neces-
sarily sends us to the historical record,' 7 to try to construct a narrative
of the past within which the behavior either fits or does not. Doing so
will allow us to think more broadly, not only about the availability (or
lack thereof) of "precedents" for activities in the present, but also about
114 James Hohmann, Legislative Filibuster May Be Next to Go, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2017, at
Ai8.
115 Donald J. Tump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2017, 6:59 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/869553853750013953 [https://perma.cc/UG8L-QGAE]; see also
Aaron Blake, Trump Asks for More Power. Here's Why the Senate GOP Will Resist., WASH. POST
THE Fix, (May 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/201-7/05/02/3-reasons-
the-gop-wont-nuke-the-filibuster-and-give-trump-more-power/ [https://perma.cc/LWg2-SSXA].
116 This is an intracameral analogue to David Pozen's observation that, "under prevailing norms
of constitutional argumentation in the separation-of-powers area, allegations that another branch
has engaged in unprecedented ... behavior can almost always be mobilized to support a claim of
enhanced discretion" by the branch making the claim. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separa-
tion of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 46 (2014).
117 Indeed, in my view, any attempt to understand politics full stop ought to send us to the his-
torical record. See CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 3-6; KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1-32 (2004).
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the choices that go into constructing a precedential relationship and the
rhetorical work that claims of unprecedentedness do.
To those ends, this Part offers two historical narratives: one of ob-
struction in Congress generally, and one of the appointments and con-
firmation process (with a focus, although not an exclusive one, on judi-
cial appointments battles). The hope is that they will provide usable
histories, allowing us to situate recent events within longer narrative
arcs of American constitutional development. These narratives will
also, as it turns out, demonstrate the deep precedentedness of claims of
unprecedentedness in discussions of American legislative procedure.
A. Legislative Obstruction
One way we might attempt to situate the recent constitutional poli-
tics of judicial appointments is with respect to the history of legislative
obstructionism more generally. Concern about obstruction began early:
the standing rules adopted by both the House and the Senate in the First
Congress limited members' ability to speak multiple times on the same
topic and provided for the chair to call members to order." In the
Manual of Parliamentary Practice that Thomas Jefferson compiled for
his own use as President of the Senate and later published, he wrote that
"[n]o one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluously
or tediously."1 19
Small-scale obstruction of course occurred from Congress's earliest
days. In August 1i789, when President Washington came in person to
the Senate to seek its advice and consent on instructions to be given to
treaty negotiators, Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania called for
both the reading of various papers aloud and the commitment of the
issue to a select committee, so as to allow the matter to be debated away
from the overawing presence of the President. 120 The delaying tactics
worked: after Washington stormed out in frustration, the Senate debated
the proposed instructions, altering some and voting others down. 121 An-
other incident the following year - this time in the House of Represent-
atives - is sometimes regarded as the first American filibuster: during
a debate over where to locate the national capital, Representatives
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and William Loughton Smith of South
118 H.R. JOURNAL, ist Cong., ist Sess. 9-10 (1789); S. JOURNAL, ist Cong., ist Sess. 13-14
(1789). Of course, such concerns did not begin with the U.S. Constitution. See CHAFETZ, supra
note 6, at 270 (noting early-seventeenth-century rules in the House of Commons aimed at curbing
dilatory tactics).
119 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 17, at 36 (Cosimo
Classics 2007) (iS0i).
120 See CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 281.
121 Id
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Carolina held the floor until their exhausted colleagues agreed to ad-
journ for the day. Their purpose in doing so was to delay passage of the
bill until one of their allies in the Senate, who had been ill, recovered
enough to vote against the bill when it got to his chamber. 1 2 2
It is worth reiterating that the "filibuster" over the location of the
capital took place in the House, not the Senate. This fact should at least
make us begin to question the oft-heard claim that there is something
about the Senate's institutional design that makes it inevitably the more
obstructive of the two chambers. Indeed, in a groundbreaking study of
legislative obstruction in American history, Gregory Koger found that
"there was more obstruction in the House than the Senate from 1789 to
1901"123 To observers at the time, this fact seemed to follow naturally
from institutional design. As Senator Richard Coke of Texas put it in
1884:
It is well known ... that bills are passed much more rapidly and with
much more facility through the Senate than through the House on account
of the difference in the constitution of the two bodies, the one small and
compact and the other large and unwieldy. It is also well known that with
the expiration of every Congress large numbers of bills which have passed
the Senate die on the Calendar of the House from non-action. 1 24
But even as Coke was speaking, this was beginning to change. The
previous year, the House Rules Committee for the first time reported out
a resolution, subsequently adopted by the full chamber, that suspended
the normal calendaring rules and allowed a particular piece of legislative
business to jump the queue. This was a hugely important innovation:
it allowed the Rules Committee to set the agenda for the chamber, and,
since the Speaker maintained tight control over (and indeed chaired) the
Rules Committee, it in effect allowed the leadership of the majority
party to set the agenda. 125
A few years later, with Speaker Thomas Reed presiding over a slim
Republican majority, Democrats began employing a "disappearing
quorum" in an effort to bring the business of the House to a standstill:
under the extant practices, only members who actually cast a vote were
counted for quorum purposes. If all of the Democrats simply refused to
vote, and if more than a handful of Republicans were absent, then the
chamber would lack a quorum and could do nothing other than
adjourn. 126 By January 1890, Reed had had enough: after Democrats
122 See Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1023-24.
123 GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE
HOUSE AND SENATE 39 (2010); see also id. at 5o fig.3.7 (graphing obstruction in the two chambers
between 1789 and igoi).
124 15 CONG. REC. 309 (1884).
125 See CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 285-87.
126 See id. at 287.
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refused to vote and thereby deprived the House of a quorum to decide
a contested election, 12 7 Reed ordered the clerk to record the names of
those Democrats "present and refusing to vote" and to count them for
quorum purposes. 1 28 The next day, Democrats objected to the usually
anodyne matter of approving the previous day's Journal and then
sought to use a disappearing quorum to prevent the Republican
majority from voting to approve it.129 Reed again counted the non-
voting Democrats as present for quorum purposes in overruling their
objections and approving the Journal.1 3 0 The debate over the previous
day's Journal took the entire day, 1 3 1 and tempers ran high: Democratic
Representative Richard Bland of Missouri called Reed "the worst tyrant
that ever presided over a deliberative body," to applause from Bland's
side of the aisle. 1 3 2
The following day began with a replay of the previous day's drama
over the Journal.1 3 3  Democrat William Bynum of Indiana, who had
attempted to move an adjournment before the vote on approving the
Journal but had been ignored, was outraged:
Mr. Speaker, it is the first time in the history of this House that the
presiding officer has turned his back on a Representative and instructed a
mere subordinate of the House to suppress him by calling the roll ....
You have gone forward, sir, you have usurped power, you have muti-
lated the records of this House to accomplish the scheme that you have
deliberately gone to work to carry out . . . . No tyrant ever ascended the
throne but who attempted to vamp up some feeble show of title to amuse
the people while he gained possession of the kingdom. You have attempted
to vamp up some feeble show to sustain your outrageous rulings . . . .1 3 4
But Reed fired back:
There is no possible way by which the orderly methods of parliamentary
procedure can be used to stop legislation. The object of a parliamentary
body is action, and not stoppage of action. Hence, if any member or set of
members undertakes to oppose the orderly progress of business, even by the
use of the ordinarily recognized parliamentary motions, it is the right of the
127 It was not a coincidence that matters came to a head over an election contest. As Richard
Valelly has shown, the contest over the Reed reforms was tied to Republican attempts to maintain
electoral power in the South by protecting the votes of African Americans. See generally Richard
M. Valelly, The Reed Rules and Republican Party Building: A New Look, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.
115 (2009).
128 21 CONG. REC. 949 (1890).
129 Id. at 977-80.
130 See id. at 978-80, 993-94.
131 See id. at 994-95 (adjourning).
132 Id. at 977.
133 See id. at 996-98.
134 Id. at 999.
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majority to refuse to have those motions entertained, and to cause the public
business to proceed.
... Whenever it becomes apparent that the ordinary and proper parlia-
mentary motions are being used solely for purposes of delay and obstruction,
when members break in an unprecedented way . . . over the rule in regard
to the reading of the Journal . . . [i]t is then the duty of the occupant of the
Speaker's chair to take, under parliamentary law, the proper course with
regard to such matters . . . .135
Two weeks later (with Democrats still refusing to vote and still objecting
when they were counted for quorum purposes13 6 ), the House adopted a
set of reforms to the chamber's standing rules.137 The revisions, which
would come to be known as the "Reed Rules," were far-reaching and
almost uniformly anti-obstructionist in content. Most significantly, they
codified the Speaker's power to count the quorum; they provided that
"[n]o dilatory motion shall be entertained by the Speaker," while leaving
the definition of "dilatory motion" to the Speaker's discretion; and they
lowered the quorum threshold in the Committee of the Whole to one
hundred members.138 Eric Schickler has described the adoption of the
Reed Rules as "without question one of the most significant events in
the institutional development of the Congress. No single change did
more to secure majority rule in the House."139
Democrats took control of the House in the 1890 elections and re-
pealed the Reed Rules in 1892. But after Minority Leader Reed led an
obstructionist campaign with the sole aim of restoring his anti-obstruc-
tionist rules, Democrats reinstated them in 1894, and Republicans re-
took control of the House in 1895, giving the speakership to Reed once
more. 140 By the end of the nineteenth century, then, the combination of
the power vested in the Rules Committeel 41 and the anti-obstruction
measures embodied in the Reed Rules had centralized power in the lead-
ership of the majority party to a significant degree, paving the way for
relatively frictionless passage of the majority leadership's agenda.
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., id. at 1326-2 7.
137 Id. at 1347.
138 Id. at 1334. On the Reed Rules, see COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1-994, H.R. Doc. No. 103-324, at 182 &
n.21- (1994); JAMES GRANT, MR. SPEAKER!: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THOMAS B. REED, THE
MAN WHO BROKE THE FILIBUSTER 268-74 (2011); ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED
PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS 32-43 (2001).
139 SCHICKLER, supra note 138, at 32.
140 See CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 287-88.
141 An observer in 1896 noted that "giving very large power to a small committee of five men,
the committee on Rules" was part of the "inevitable tendency towards the centralization of power"
in the Speaker. M.P. FOLLETT, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 307
(New York, Longmans, Green, and Co. 1896).
I14 [VoL. 131:96
THE SUPREME COURT - ESSAY I 15
Indeed, by the first decade of the twentieth century, Speaker Joseph
Cannon, a conservative Republican from Illinois, controlled House pro-
ceedings with such ruthless efficiency that a New York Times profile
described him as "the greatest absolute monarch on earth":
[I]n Russia the Czar is hedged about by bureaus; in Persia the Shah holds
his throne by main strength; the President of the United States has to take
counsel with Cabinet, Senate, and House, and the boss of Tammany Hall
with his district leaders; but the "Yes" of the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives passes a bill and makes a law, and the "No" kills it.142
But hubris precedes nemesis, and the reaction against Cannon was not
far off. In 1910, a cross-partisan coalition of Democrats and progressive
Republicans passed a change to the standing rules taking control of the
Rules Committee away from the Speaker. Thenceforth, the Committee
would be elected by ballot and would choose its own chair; the Speaker
was forbidden to serve on the Committee. 14 3  After Republicans lost
control of the House the following year, the new Democratic majority
changed the rules to provide that the members and chairs of all standing
committees would be elected by ballot, further diminishing the speaker-
ship. 1 4 4 In practice, a strong seniority system for committee chairman-
ships became the norm in both parties, 14 5 which in turn set the stage for
a significant decentralization of power in the House, as long-serving
chairs built their own fiefdoms. 1 4 6  In addition, the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 aimed at (and was successful at) empower-
ing committees in both chambers by decreasing their numbers, bulking
up their staffing, and formally delineating their jurisdictions. 1 4 7 As a
practical matter, this meant that tremendous power in the House was in
the hands of Southern Democrats for much of the twentieth century,1 48
which of course allowed them to obstruct legislation of which they
disapproved. 149
Again, however, pushback was not far off. Younger, more liberal
Democrats began organizing via the Democratic Study Group starting
142 A Glimpse into Speaker Cannon's Famous Red Room, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 13, 1908, at 8.
143 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 288-89.
144 Id. at 289.
145 Id.
146 Nelson W. Polsby et al., The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Represent-
atives, 63 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 787, 802-06 (1969).
147 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 2 92-94.
148 See Eric Schickler, The Development of the Congressional Committee System, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 712, 729 (George C. Edwards III et al.
eds., 2011) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
149 On conservative obstruction generally, see Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., et al., Mobilization of Lib-
eral Strength in the House, 1955-1g7o The Democratic Study Group, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 667,
667, 669 (1974). On the strength of Howard Smith of Virginia as Rules Committee chair for much
of this period, see Charles 0. Jones, Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W Smith: An Essay on the
Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives, 30 J. POL. 617, 635-38 (1968).
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in 1959, aiming to provide a counterweight to the procedural conserva-
tive biases.1 5 0 Beginning in the 1970s, that push began to bear fruit: a
central purpose of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 was to
curb the power of committee chairs, 1 5 1 and subsequent developments in
cameral rules and party organization - including moving away from
strict seniority norms - further eroded their influence. 15 2 Committee
chairs' loss of influence was party leaderships' gain: in the 1970s, the
Rules Committee again came under the control of the Speaker, and the
rise of closed and restricted special rules made that committee more
powerful than ever.1 5 3 The result, by the 1980s and 1990s, was a "re-
centralization of power in the speakership," 15 4 which in turn meant far
fewer opportunities for obstruction and delay of the majority party's
agenda. (It is entirely possible that events of recent years, including the
rise of the Freedom Caucus in the Republican Party and its success in
ousting Speaker John Boehner in 2015, portend another swing of the
pendulum in the decentralizing direction. 155)
Meanwhile, in the Senate, legislative obstruction remained minimal
for most of the nineteenth century. Koger does not identify a Senate
filibuster until 1831;156 for most of the rest of the century, filibusters
remained quite rare, and filibustered bills generally passed at the end of
the day. 1 5  As the Senate grew in size and workload (twelve states were
admitted to the Union between the end of the Civil War and the out-
break of World War I), and as the House became comparatively more
efficient, attention turned toward obstruction in the upper chamber. On
March 4, 1917, the Armed Ship Bill, which would have armed the mer-
chant marine against German U-boat attacks, fell to a filibuster when a
group of eleven pacifist senators, led by Robert La Follette of Wisconsin,
ran out the clock on the Sixty-Fourth Congress.s1 5  President Wilson,
who had just been sworn in for his second term, was outraged, declaring
that a "little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own,
have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and
150 See Stevens et al., supra note 149, at 669-71.
151 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 294-95; Walter Kravitz, The Legislative Reorganization Act of
19, 1-5 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375, 376-77 (1990).
152 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 295.
153 Id.
154 C. Lawrence Evans, Congressional Committees, in HANDBOOK, supra note 148, at 396, 400.
This development reached its apotheosis with the speakership of Newt Gingrich (1995-1999), whose
leadership one observer describes as having transformed the House of Representatives into "the
American House of Commons." Sam Tanenhaus, The Power of Congress, NEW YORKER, Jan. 19,
2015, at 69, 74.
155 See Ryan Lizza, A House Divided, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2015, at 30.
156 KOGER, supra note 123, at 62.
157 See id. at 6o fig.4.3.
158 Bitter Wrangle as Senate Closes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1917, at I; see also Chafetz, supra note
31, at 1027.
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contemptible."1 5 9 This, he declared, was "a situation unparalleled in the
history of the country, perhaps unparalleled in the history of any modern
Government."1 60  Wilson was not alone in his outrage: at a three-
thousand-person rally in Carnegie Hall two days later, the names of the
filibusterers were greeted with cries of "Traitor!" and "Hang them!" 16 1
Indeed, the public pressure was so intense that some of the "willful men"
denied that they had taken part in a filibuster at all; 1 6 2 by March 8, after
only six hours of debate, the Senate adopted its first cloture rule by a
vote of seventy-six to three. 163 The rule permitted debate on a matter
to be brought to a close by two-thirds vote. 1 64
Still, for most of the twentieth century, filibusters remained rare in
the Senate. Except at the end of a Congress, they required both signif-
icant physical endurance and a willingness to infuriate one's colleagues
by bringing the business of the chamber to a halt. 16 5  As a result, fili-
busters were largely reserved for issues that raised especially intense op-
position - for much of the twentieth century, that meant that filibusters
were largely focused on civil rights bills. 16 6 But beginning in the 1970s,
filibusters began to be employed with increasing regularity.1 6 7 Just as
the House was experiencing a backlash against obstructionism during
this period,1 68 so too was the Senate. In addition to the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1970, described above, the Senate in 1975 lowered
the cloture threshold (for everything other than rules changes) to three-
fifths and instituted a "tracking" system, whereby other measures could
move forward while one matter was being filibustered. 16 9  These
measures, which Koger identifies as emblematic of a broader move from
attrition to cloture as the means of ending filibusters, 170 likely had the
159 Woodrow Wilson, Statement (Mar. 4, 1917), in 17 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8217, 8218 (1921).
160 Id. at 8217.
161 Great Mass Meeting Here, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1917, at i.
162 'Willful Men' Deny Aiding Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, I917, at 3.
163 Senate Adopts Closure 76 to 3; 'Willful Men' Reply to President; May Call New Congress at
Once: Alters Rule of ioo Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1917, at i.
164 Id.
165 For two different measurements of Senate filibustering across the twentieth century, both of
which show a dramatic uptick beginning in the early 19703, see KOGER, supra note 123, at 107
figs.6.3 & 6.4. For a measurement of cloture votes across this period showing a similar pattern, see
Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1oog tbl.
166 See KOGER, supra note 123, at 116-24; Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1027.
167 Koger identifies the increase in value of Senate floor time as the causal mechanism. KOGER,
supra note 123, at 133-46. For my purposes here, the causes are less important than the reactions.
168 See supra pp. 115-16.
169 SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 15, 163 (1997); WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 212 (7th ed. 2007).170 KOGER, supra note 123, at 137, 147-87.
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unintended consequence of increasing and routinizing the use of the fil-
ibuster.1 71 By the 1990s, it was accurate to describe the filibuster as
nothing more than a sixty-vote requirement for the passage of most busi-
ness through the Senate. 17 2 And by the beginning of the twenty-first
century, frustrations had begun to boil over, with consequences that
were partly traced in Part I.
How, then, might we characterize this narrative of legislative ob-
structionism in American history? Broadly speaking, minorities look for
procedural tools - things like the mechanism of quorum-counting or
the lack of a formal procedural mechanism to bring debate to a close -
that they can employ to thwart or delay the majority's agenda. When
the obstruction becomes pervasive enough that the majority, over some
extended period of time, finds it intolerable, the obstructive tactics are
restricted or eliminated. At such flashpoints, both the obstructors and
those seeking to eliminate obstruction accuse the other side of unprece-
dented behavior. This is what happened with Speaker Reed's rulings
from the chair and the subsequently codified Reed Rules; it is what hap-
pened with the creation of the cloture mechanism in 1917; and it is what
happened with the reduction in power of the committee chairs in the
1970s. At the same time, legislators are apt to fear that too much cen-
tralization of cameral authority threatens their individual prerogatives.
The revolt against Speaker Cannon, the recent difficulties of Speakers
Boehner and Ryan, and the deliberate pace at which filibuster reform
has proceeded in the Senate are all evidence of this worry about over-
centralization. The result is a broad pattern of push and pull, of reforms
aimed at limiting the minority's ability to obstruct while remaining vig-
ilant against making things too easy for majority leadership.
The judicial appointments controversies of the last decade and a
half, traced in Part I, fit this longer historical pattern nicely. The mi-
nority party increasingly seizes on the tools of obstruction, frustrating
the majority. The majority strikes back, through mechanisms like re-
ducing deference to home-state senators and issuing recess appoint-
ments. This, in turn, enrages the minority, which ramps up obstruction
still further. There are short-lived attempts (such as those in 2004 and
2005) at restoring the status quo ante in the interest of preventing too
much power from being consolidated in the hands of majority leader-
ship, but ultimately the dam breaks, with the majority detonating the
"nuclear option" in 2013 and 2017.
171 Id. at 178 ("Instead of reducing obstruction, these reforms institutionalized the notion that
filibustering was an ordinary element of Senate decisionmaking.").
172 Chafetz, supra note 31, at ic008-1.
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Of course, one can characterize many of these moves in such a way
as to make the "unprecedented" label fit (or, perhaps, so as to make the
events fit the label). But, as this section has demonstrated, one can also
locate the events squarely within the longer historical arc of congres-
sional debates over obstructive tactics.
B. Appointments Politics
One can also locate the events described in Part I within the longer
historical arc of American confirmation politics. How much deference
should we expect the President to receive in the appointments context?
The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that it depends. Confirmation
politics has been contentious throughout American history: In 1795,
John Rutledge, who was serving as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
under a recess appointment, was voted down on the Senate floor.
Rutledge had outspokenly and vehemently opposed the Jay Treaty with
Britain, and even though Washington nominated him knowing this, the
Federalist press strongly opposed him, and Federalist senators followed
suit.1 7 3 Nor was Rutledge the only high-profile nominee voted down in
the early Republic: even with overwhelming Republican margins in
both houses of Congress, James Madison's desire at the beginning of his
presidency to move Albert Gallatin from Treasury to State was thwarted
by opposition in the Senate,1 7 4 and in 1815, Madison was allowed to
withdraw Henry Dearborn's nomination as Secretary of War after the
Senate had voted to reject him.175 In 118j, Madison's nomination of
Connecticut customs collector Alexander Wolcott to the Supreme Court
was rejected by an astonishing twenty-four-to-nine vote.17 6 These re-
jections were emblematic of the "deep and bitter estrangement between
Madison and his Congresses."17 7
Other early Presidents faced similar appointments difficulties. In the
lame-duck period following his crushing defeat by Andrew Jackson in
the 1828 election, John Quincy Adams nominated William Creighton
and Henry Gurley to district judgeships and John Crittenden to the
173 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 51-52 & 355 n.io (rev. ed. 2003).
174 See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 481-82 (1971).
175 GERHARDT, supra note 173, at lxi & lxiii n.i tbl.5.
176 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, iith Cong., 3 d Sess. 167 (1811). On Wolcott, see Keith E. Whittington,
Presidents, Senates, and Failed Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 401, 42 9-30.
177 Walter Kravitz, Evolution of the Senate's Committee System, 411 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 27, 29-30 (1974). In Harlow's even more brutal assessment, "Madison could hardly
have played a less important part during those eight uncomfortable years if he had remained in
Virginia." RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE
PERIOD BEFORE 1825, at 196 (1917).
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Supreme Court." In all three cases, the Jacksonian-dominated cham-
ber passed a resolution declaring that it was "not expedient to act upon
the nomination . . . during the present session." 1 9 As John Chambers,
an anti-Jacksonian who had served in the House in the previous Con-
gress, wrote to Crittenden, the Jacksonians had an "ulterior object in
view. Three of the present Judges of [the Supreme] Court are very old
& becoming infirm. A party ascendancy in the Court is therefore hoped
for and will be obtained if possible."18 0 Chambers expressed his hope
that:
[T]here are a sufficient number of the Jackson senators to carry the nomi-
nation who will be above disgraceful and degrading party feeling which
would snatch from the present executive, the power of appointment to of-
fices for the avowed, or to say the least of it, obvious purpose of reserving
it for a successful competitor to reward his partisans."1
When it became clear that hope would be disappointed, Chambers la-
mented in a subsequent letter: "What a set of corrupt scoundrels . . . and
what an infernal precedent they are about to set."1 8 2
Although Jackson did get to fill those seats with his copartisans,18 3
he ran into a number of problems with appointments as well. Evincing
some discontent with Jackson's "spoils system," the Senate rejected ten
of his nominees in the first year of his presidency, although four of the
ten were subsequently confirmed. 18 4 Jackson was handily reelected in
1832, but the anti-Jacksonians picked up control of the Senate; 1 5 in the
aftermath, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected the nomination of
Benjamin Tappan to a district judgeship,18 6 and it twice rejected Roger
Brooke Taney - once to be Secretary of the Treasury and a second time
178 S. EXEC.JOURNAL, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. 621 (1828) (nominating Creighton); id. at 622 (nom-
inating Crittenden); id. at 630-31 (1829) (nominating Gurley).
179 Id. at 644 (Crittenden); id. at 645 (Creighton); id. (Gurley).
180 David J. Danelski, Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 Nw.
U. L. REV. goo, 907 (iggo) (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from John Chambers to John
Crittenden (Dec. 29, 1828) (available in John J. Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.)).
181 Id.
182 Id. (quoting Letter from John Chambers to John Crittenden (Jan. 28, 1829) (available in John
J. Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)).
183 See Whittington, supra note 176, at 416. The Supreme Court seat for which Crittenden had
been nominated went to John McLean, which allowed Jackson to appoint someone more accom-
modating of patronage politics to McLean's old job, Postmaster General. See CHAFETZ, supra
note 6, at iio.
184 See GERHARDT, supra note 173, at gl; Erik McKinley Eriksson, The Federal Civil Service
Under President Jackson, 13 MIss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 517, 524-25 (1927).
185 The hostility of the Senate in the Twenty-Third Congress toward Jackson can also be seen in
its censure of him and declaration that he had breached its privileges - the equivalent of a finding
of contempt of Congress. See CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 174.
186 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2 3 d Cong., ist Sess. 412 (1834).
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to be an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court - largely out of un-
happiness with his performance as Jackson's recess-appointed Treasury
Secretary. 8 7 But the congressional Jacksonians did better in the 1834
midterms (and picked up a number of Senate seats during the Twenty-
Fourth Congress)1 8 as a result, when John Marshall died in 1835, the
Senate confirmed Taney as his replacement." 9
One of the senators who gave Jackson a tough time with his appoint-
ments was John Tyler of Virginia.19 0 Tyler had been a lukewarm
Jackson supporter before becoming increasingly disenchanted over the
course of Jackson's presidency.191 He came to identify with the nascent
opposition to Jacksonianism, throwing his lot in with the emerging Whig
Party in the 1830s. 19 2 Ultimately, after a number of others declined to
be considered or were rejected as unsuitable, he was chosen "by default"
as the vice presidential nominee for the first unified national Whig ticket
in 1840.193 When William Henry Harrison became the first President
to die in office a mere thirty-one days after his inauguration, Tyler be-
came the first Vice President to ascend to the presidency - and was
promptly nicknamed "His Accidency." 1 9 4 But simple anti-Jacksonian-
ism proved insufficient as a governing platform, and Tyler, who re-
mained a Jeffersonian Republican at heart, was never on board with the
legislative agenda that Whigs in Congress (led by Henry Clay) were de-
veloping. After vetoing several bills central to that agenda, Tyler was
expelled from the Whig Party five months after assuming the presidency,
and the party subsequently opposed him at every turn.1 9 5 Appointments
were central to that opposition: in his single term, Tyler had seven re-
jected cabinet nominations. Three of these rejections were of Caleb
Cushing to be Treasury Secretary: Tyler kept nominating him, and the
Senate kept rejecting him.1 9 6 Moreover, Tyler made nine total nomina-
tions of five individuals (again, nominating several repeatedly) in an at-
tempt to fill two Supreme Court vacancies. Ultimately, only one was
187 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at iio.
188 As a result of growing Jacksonian strength in the chamber, the Senate's 1834 censure of Jack-
son, see supra note 185, was officially expunged in 1837, see CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 174.
189 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at iio.
190 See, e.g., S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2 3 d Cong., ist Sess. 427-28 (1834) (noting Tyler's vote against
confirming Taney as Treasury Secretary).
191 See GARY MAY, JOHN TYLER 33-47 (2008).
192 See id. at 44, 49.
193 Id. at 53.
194 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at iII.
195 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 37-61 (2013); see also Josh Chafetz, The Contingency of Partisanship,
TAKE CARE (Mar. 27, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-contingency-of-partisanship
[https://perma.cc/G3GP-XW36].
196 GERHARDT, supra note 173, at io6.
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confirmed: Samuel Nelson in 1845.'9 (Nelson, a moderate Democrat,
was confirmed after Democrat James K. Polk won the 1844 presidential
election. As Gerhardt notes, "the Democrats [in the Senate] were dis-
posed to approve one of their own, and the Whigs regarded him as a
less offensive choice than any of the Democrats Polk was likely to
pick."198 ) Tyler also suffered several failed lower-court nominations.19 9
A President with neither a party nor a popular constituency, it turned
out, was unlikely to get the personnel of his choosing through the Senate.
With the death of Zachary Taylor in 1850, Millard Fillmore became
the second Vice President to ascend to the presidency and the last of the
four Whig Presidents. During the Thirty-Second Congress, with
Democrats controlling both houses, two Supreme Court vacancies arose.
Benjamin Curtis was rather swiftly confirmed to fill the first vacancy,200
but the Senate refused to confirm anyone to the second seat, despite
Fillmore's nominating three different people between August 1852 and
February 1853.201 By the time of the second and third nominations,
Democrat Franklin Pierce had already been elected to succeed
Fillmore - like Tyler, Fillmore could not even find a party to nominate
him to run for reelection - and the Senate Democratic majority pre-
ferred to hold the seat open for Pierce to fill. 202
Events surrounding the Civil War also gave rise to some high-stakes
appointments politicking. After Lincoln had been elected and Southern
states had begun to secede, President Buchanan nominated his Secretary
of State (and former Attorney General), Jeremiah Black, to fill the
Supreme Court vacancy caused by Peter Daniel's death. 203 Black was
a strong supporter of the Slave Power,204 and, as the withdrawal of sen-
ators from seceding states had given Republicans a slim Senate majority
at the end of the Thirty-Sixth Congress, Black was defeated in a party-
line vote. 205  Several historians have suggested that a number of
Republican senators were motivated by the desire to hold the seat open
for Lincoln. 206 Not only did Lincoln get to fill the seat (with Republican
197 See Supreme Court Nominations: Present-789, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm [https://perma.cc/S3FZ- 4 N3 U].
198 GERHARDT, supra note 173, at 57.
199 See Michael J. Gerhardt & Michael Ashley Stein, The Politics of Early Justice: Federal Judi-
cial Selection, 1y89-186z, i00 IOWA L. REV. 551, 561-62 tbl. (2015).
200 See U.S. SENATE, supra note 197.
201 Id.
202 GERHARDT, supra note 173, at 149-50.
203 Whittington, supra note 176, at 424.
204 See Mark A. Graber, Black, Jeremiah Sullivan (18io-83), in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 51, 51-52 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
205 Whittington, supra note 176, at 424.
206 See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 31 (5 th ed.
2008); DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT I9 (2003).
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Samuel Miller), but Congress also, in 1863, expanded the Court to ten
Justices, in order to give Lincoln another appointment. 207
With Lincoln's assassination in 1865, Andrew Johnson, a War
Democrat put on the ticket as a show of unity, became the third Vice
President to ascend to the presidency. Like Tyler and Fillmore, he could
claim no particularly strong base of either public or congressional au-
thority; like Tyler, he was immediately an outsider to the party appa-
ratus that brought him to power. And to boot, he was famously irasci-
ble. 208 As tensions over Reconstruction escalated, Congress responded
by attempting to limit Johnson's power over personnel. In 1866, it re-
duced the size of the Supreme Court to seven Justices (with the Court's
membership to decline to that number as serving Justices retired or
died), so as to prevent Johnson from getting any appointments. 20 9 The
following year, both the Tenure of Office Act and a rider to the Army
Appropriations Act purported to limit Johnson's power to fire holdovers
from the Lincoln Administration, and his impeachment in 1868 was pre-
cipitated by his violation of those strictures. 2 1 0 After Johnson's narrow
acquittal, he nominated Henry Stanbery as Attorney General. Stanbery
had previously held the office from 1866 to 1868, but he resigned to
defend Johnson in his Senate trial. Apparently to punish Stanbery for
defending Johnson, his nomination was defeated by an overwhelming
vote of twenty-nine to eleven. 2 1 1 (Johnson's nomination of Thomas
Ewing to be Secretary of War earlier in 1868 had not even been taken
up by the Senate, as Johnson's dismissal of the previous Secretary of
War, Edwin Stanton, was the precipitating event for Johnson's impeach-
ment.2 1 2 ) One of the first laws signed by President Grant in 1869 ex-
panded the Supreme Court back to nine Justices, giving him an early
appointment.2 13  Grant initially squandered the gift by nominating
Ebenezer Hoar, who was widely disliked in the Senate and was voted
down on the floor.2 14 Joseph Bradley was confirmed to the seat a couple
of months later.2 1 5
207 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 112.
208 On Johnson's temperament, see Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 347, 401-03 (2010).
209 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at I12.
210 Id. at 112-13.
211 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4 oth Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1868); Bruce Tap, Stanbery, Henry, AM.
NAT'L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (Feb. 2000), http://www.anb.org/articles/04/o4-oo939.html
[https://perma.cc/5 4 ZP-2W8S].
212 R. Owen Williams, Ewing, Thomas, AM. NAT'L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (July 9, 2008),
http://www.anb.org/articles/o7/o7-oo805.html [https://perma.cc/E5 3 F-D3 CB].
213 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 113.
214 GERHARDT, supra note 173, at lxxxi tbl. 7 , 155.215 See U.S. SENATE, supra note 197.
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In i88i, President Hayes - who had promised to serve only one
term - nominated Stanley Matthews to the Supreme Court seat vacated
by Noah Swayne. Matthews faced heavy opposition from populist and
agrarian groups, who believed he was too close to corporate interests. 2 16
He had also been Hayes's lawyer before the special Electoral Commis-
sion that had resolved the 1876 election in Hayes's favor, and he had
helped broker the deal with House Democrats that convinced them to
accept the Commission's conclusion. 2 17 Democrats had control of the
Senate, and they simply ran out the clock, keeping Matthews bottled up
in committee. 2 18 "To the shock of almost everyone," President Garfield
renominated Matthews upon taking office. 2 19 With the Senate now
evenly divided and some of Matthews's staunchest opponents from the
previous Congress gone, he was eventually confirmed by a one-vote
margin.220
Nor were presidential personnel problems limited to the nineteenth
century. In 1925, President Coolidge, a Republican, twice nominated
Charles Beecher Warren to be Attorney General. Despite Republican
control of the Senate, a cross-partisan coalition of Democrats and pro-
gressive Republicans twice defeated him, on the grounds that he was
too close to big business. 2 2 1 This critique had special resonance in the
immediate aftermath of the Teapot Dome scandal, which involved oil
companies' bribing Interior Secretary Albert Fall to lease them naval
petroleum reserves at low prices, without competitive bidding. 2 22 A
decade later, Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court
was famously shot down by Congress in 193 7.223 Largely in response to
the Court's jurisprudential "switch in time" (especially with respect to
federal laws in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.2 24) and Justice
Van Devanter's decision to retire, thus ensuring a New Deal-friendly
Court majority in the future, public opinion turned against Roosevelt's
plan. 2 25 It would be a mistake to view the Court-packing plan as a
major defeat for Roosevelt, however: although the Court remained at
nine Justices, both its jurisprudence and its composition shifted in the
216 JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 38-41
(1998).
217 Id. at 38.
218 Id. at 41.
219 Id. at 42.
220 Id. at 42-43.
221 GERHARDT, supra note 173, at 165.
222 See generally ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND HIS
ADMINISTRATION 461-73 (1969).
223 For a lively account of the fight in Congress, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE 223-34 (2009).
224 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
225 See Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing
Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1147-49 (1987).
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President's preferred direction. By contrast, a couple of decades later,
President Eisenhower suffered an unambiguous personnel defeat when
he tried to make his friend Lewis Strauss Secretary of Commerce. 2 2 6 In
1958 - mere weeks before the midterm election - Eisenhower recess
appointed Strauss to the Commerce post. Strauss had spent years an-
noying members of Congress of both parties by stonewalling questions
in his previous roles as Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission and
Special Adviser to the President on atomic energy, and he had especially
irritated senior Democrats like Senator Clinton Anderson. 2 2 7 The 1958
midterms were a landslide for the Democrats, and a number of
Democratic senators began preparing for a run at the White House in
1960. In this context, Eisenhower nominated Strauss to the Commerce
position, and Strauss promptly alienated more senators with his dis-
missive demeanor at his confirmation hearings. 2 28 As one historian put
it, there developed a "growing sense that no Democratic senator who
supported Strauss would have a chance at the party's presidential nom-
ination." 2 2 9 Strauss was defeated by a vote of forty-six to forty-nine; an
outraged Eisenhower called it "the second most shameful day in Senate
history," after only the Andrew Johnson impeachment trial.23 0
And of course a number of late-twentieth-century Presidents had sig-
nificant trouble with their Supreme Court nominees. This included
nominees who were perceived to have ethical liabilities (like Abe Fortas
in his nomination as Chief Justice, 2 3 1 Clement Haynsworth 2 3 2 and
Douglas Ginsburg 233), nominees who were simply perceived to be "me-
diocre" (as Senator Hruska infamously, and unsuccessfully, tried to de-
fend Harrold Carswell 234 and as a number of Republicans criticized
Harriet Miers 2 35), and nominees who were perceived to be out of the
ideological mainstream (as Democrats successfully portrayed Robert
Bork 2 3 6 ). But these stated rationales do not tell the whole story; the
surrounding political circumstances are at least as important. Lyndon
Johnson nominated Fortas to be Chief Justice in mid-1968. With
Johnson not running for reelection and Republicans confident that
226 On the Strauss nomination generally, see Richard Allan Baker, A Slap at the "Hidden-Hand
Presidency": The Senate and the Lewis Strauss Affair, 14 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY I (1987).
227 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 131-32.
228 Id. at 132.
229 Baker, supra note 226, at 9.
230 Id. at i-.
231 See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR. & LORI A. RINGHAND, SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 22 (2013).
232 See id. at 130.
233 See GERHARDT, supra note 173, at 186.
234 See ii6 CONG. REC. 7881 (1970).
235 See ABRAHAM, supra note 206, at 320.
236 See GERHARDT, supra note 173, at 183.
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Nixon would win, Fortas was filibustered until Johnson withdrew the
nomination, 2 3 7 allowing Nixon to appoint Warren Burger to the chief
justiceship. But Democrats still held the Senate (albeit by a reduced
margin), and a number of Democratic senators clearly opposed
Haynsworth as a form of payback for the defeat of the Fortas nomina-
tion, especially given that each was accused of similar improprieties. 2 38
Angered by Haynsworth's defeat, Nixon looked for an ideologically sim-
ilar nominee without the ethical baggage. 2 3 9 But Democrats, embold-
ened by their defeat of Haynsworth, made issues of both Carswell's ide-
ology and his competence and defeated his nomination as well, resulting
in the appointment of the much more ideologically moderate Harry
Blackmun. 2 4 0
As a result of the Iran-Contra scandal, Democrats also controlled the
Senate when Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the Supreme Court.
This control allowed Democrats to stage the hearings in such a way as
to win over the public, a task made easier by Reagan's sagging popu-
larity.2 4 1 Bork's nomination was thus handily defeated, whereas only a
year earlier the (then Republican-controlled) Senate had unanimously
confirmed his fellow originalist, Antonin Scalia. 2 4 2 The same political
circumstances that gave rise to Bork's defeat meant that Douglas
Ginsburg was unable to escape the cloud of his past marijuana use and
was forced to withdraw. Ultimately, Anthony Kennedy, who was much
more palatable to the Democratic majority, was confirmed. 2 4 3
George W. Bush was also deeply unpopular when he nominated
Harriet Miers. Despite Republican control of the Senate, she was forced
to withdraw when it became clear that many Republicans were not will-
ing to defer to Bush's choice 24 4 - but, because of Republican control,
the end result was the confirmation of Samuel Alito, who was widely
seen to be more conservative. By contrast, after Democrats had retaken
the Senate in the 2006 elections and with Bush's public standing at a
nadir, Democratic opposition forced him to pick Michael Mukasey as
Attorney General rather than several more reliable conservatives whose
names had been floated. 2 4 5
237 See id. at 107, 126-27, 183.
238 See id. at 188-89; GEORGE L. WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE
POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 40-41, 48 (1995).
239 WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 238, at 31.
240 Id. at 31-32, 48, 73-75.
241 See CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 2 2-24.
242 U.S. SENATE, supra note 197.
243 CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 23.
244 Id. at 129.
245 Id. at 125-26.
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So how might we characterize this second narrative, this time of
struggles over appointments? Put simply, confirmation politics is part
of the broader current of interbranch politics, and the determinants of
the success or failure of a President's nominees will not be so dissimilar
from the determinants of the success or failure of other parts of her
agenda. 2 4 6 Or to be a bit more specific, Presidents enjoying success in
the public sphere - as measured both by their party's representation in
Congress and by more diffuse indicia of public support - are more
likely to get the personnel they want confirmed. At the same time,
choices of whom to nominate and success or failure in getting those
nominees confirmed may affect a President's public standing. 247
Presidents who have lost or never really had public support will have
significantly more difficulty: they may see some nominees stalled or de-
feated, and they may find themselves forced to nominate suboptimal
(from their own point of view) candidates in order to ensure Senate con-
firmation. This pattern holds across different types of nominees (exec-
utive and judicial, higher- and lower-ranking), and it manifests in dif-
ferent procedural forms. Thus, we've seen judicial nominees voted
down on the Senate floor, from Rutledge to Bork. We've seen judicial
nominees denied votes, from Creighton, Gurley, and Crittenden to
Fortas. We've seen cabinet officials blocked, from Gallatin and Dear-
born to Strauss.
Once again, the judicial appointments battles of recent years, dis-
cussed in Part I, fit into this broad pattern. When Presidents are riding
relatively high in the public sphere - as George W. Bush was in the
immediate aftermath of his reelection and Obama was in the immediate
aftermath of both of his elections - they have relatively more success
in the confirmation process, even if doing so necessitates the sorts of
procedural changes traced out in the previous section. When they are
doing less well overall, they also do less well in confirmations. Thus,
Bush did significantly better in the iogth Congress than in the iioth,
and Obama enjoyed high success rates in both the IIIth Congress, im-
mediately after his election, and the iI 3 th Congress, after his reelection,
when Democrats invoked the nuclear option. By contrast, Obama did
worse in the 112th Congress, after the "shellacking" 248 of the 2010 mid-
terms, and he did much worse - including, of course, the refusal to
consider Garland - in the II 4 th Congress. 2 4 9
246 See generally id. at 119-34.
247 See id. at 20-24 (discussing the dynamics of political actors' engagement in the public sphere).
248 Baker & Hulse, supra note 55.
249 As of this writing, it is too soon to say much about Tump's record with judicial appointments.
With Republicans in control of the Senate in the ii 5 th Congress, and with the elimination of the
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As we have seen, some scholars have deemed Senate Republicans'
obstruction of the Garland nomination unprecedented. 2 5 0  Recall that
Kar and Mazzone induced a "historical rule that ... the Senate may
only deliberately transfer one President's [ii] Supreme Court
appointment powers [2] to an unknown successor ... if [31 there are
contemporaneous questions about the status of the nominating President
as the most recently elected President." 2 5 1  Condition (i) is meant to
exclude all lower court appointments and nonjudicial appointments. 2 5 2
Condition (2) is meant to exclude the nominations of Crittenden, Black,
and Matthews, on the grounds that the identity of the President-elect
was known at the time those nominations were made. 25 3 Condition (3)
is meant to exclude Tyler's nominees, Fillmore's nominees, and the
shrinking of the Court's size to prevent Andrew Johnson from getting
any nominees confirmed. 25 4 Fortas apparently does not count because,
al-though he was filibustered and although it was clear that the
filibuster would have the effect of handing the nomination to Lyndon
Johnson's successor (and indeed it was clear that a number of
Republican senators anticipated and desired this outcome), the Senate
at least held "confirmation hearings and floor debates." 2 5 5 (Technically,
this is not quite correct: the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the motion
to proceed to consideration of the Fortas nomination, and therefore it
filibuster for all nominees, it would not be surprising to see high confirmation rates. But Trump's
low public standing, see, e.g., Harry Enten, Six Months In, Trump Is Historically Unpopular,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 17, 2017, 5:59 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/six-months-in-
trump-is-historically-unpopular/ [https://perma.cc/7RBS- 3 TC2], would suggest that he is unlikely
to be afforded great deference, even by copartisans. In this regard, it is telling that one of his
original cabinet nominees, Andrew Puzder for Labor Secretary, was forced to withdraw for lack of
support in Congress. See Alan Rappeport, Labor Choice Drops Out After Republicans Balk, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2017, at Ai. It is certainly possible that the only reason the Senate has not rejected
more Trump executive branch and independent agency nominees is that the Administration has
been so slow to make nominations. See Karen Yourish & Gregor Aisch, The Top Jobs in Trump's
Administration Are Mostly Vacant: Who's to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/I7/us/politics/trump-appointments.html [https://perma.cc/4AWV-
M9 6 9 ].
Given his low public standing, we might expect to see Trump nominate judges that Senate
Republican leadership would prefer, rather than those that he would most prefer, insofar as he has
a discernible view on the matter. Bush's failed nomination of Harriet Miers, followed by his suc-
cessful nomination of Samuel Alito, may be instructive here: a relatively weak President who nev-
ertheless commands a Senate majority may need to move toward his party in the Senate, because
he will be unable to make the congressional party move toward him. In this regard, Neil Gorsuch
may look a lot like Alito.
250 See supra pp. 107-09.
251 Kar & Mazzone, supra note go, at 6o.
252 See id. at 76-80.
253 See id. at 68-72.
254 See id. at 63-68.
255 Id. at 8g.
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was never considered on the Senate floor.2 5 6 Given the weight Kar and
Mazzone place on formal distinctions, this seems significant.) Fortas
also does not count because there was no "actual vacancy," as Earl
Warren's retirement took effect upon the confirmation of a successor. 2 5 7
So: if we focus only on nominations to the Supreme Court, and we
exclude nominations made after the election of a successor, and we
exclude nominations made by Vice Presidents who ascend to the
presidency (nine of the forty-five Presidents, although four subsequently
won reelection), and we exclude nominations to seats that will not
technically become vacant until the successor is confirmed, and we
exclude nominations that got a committee hearing, then the Senate's
holding open of a seat for the next President was unprecedented. This
claim, of course, is not wrong: the description, at that level of specificity,
fits the data. But so do many other descriptions: the Senate had never
held open a Supreme Court seat for the next President when the
nominee's last name began with G, or when the nominating President's
last name began with any letter other than A, B, F, H, J, or T. One
needs a reason to think that the criteria picked out are explanatory, not
merely correlative. For instance, why should it matter per se that Tyler,
Fillmore, and Andrew Johnson were Vice Presidents who ascended to
the presidency? So were Theodore Roosevelt and Gerald Ford, and both
of them had Justices confirmed during the presidential term in which
they ascended (Oliver Wendell Holmes and William Day for Roosevelt
and John Paul Stevens for Ford). 2 5 8 And if the issue is who gets to shape
the bench for the future, why should it matter that Earl Warren's
resignation was conditional or that Fortas got a hearing?
An explanation that fits the data equally well - and that, to my
mind, at least, is more persuasive as an explanatory matter - is that
Supreme Court nominations, like other nominations, are subject to
many of the same forces as other parts of the President's agenda. Tyler,
Fillmore, and Andrew Johnson had particularly poor standing in the
public sphere at the time the Senate refused to allow them to appoint
Justices. Failure to get their nominees confirmed was one manifestation
of their poor public standing, but there were a number of others. Per-
haps most starkly, none of the three was able to convince a major party
to nominate him to run for election to the presidency in his own right, 2 5 9
and Johnson was impeached and very nearly convicted. 2 6 0 This poor
public standing is not unrelated to how they came into the presidency,
as I have traced above. But poor public standing is also not the same
256 114 CONG. REC. 28,933 (1968).
257 Kar & Mazzone, supra note go, at 81; see id. at 81-82.
258 U.S. SENATE, supra note 197.
259 See GERHARDT, supra note 195, at 38 (Tyler); id. at 93 (Fillmore); HANS L. TREFOUSSE,
ANDREW JOHNSON: A BIOGRAPHY 336-40 (1989) (Johnson).
260 See TREFOUSSE, supra note 259, at 311-34.
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as how they came into the presidency, as Roosevelt and Ford show.
Moreover, poor public standing is what they shared with John Quincy
Adams, Buchanan, Hayes, and Lyndon Johnson - and it is also what
they have in common with Madison throughout his presidency,
Eisenhower in 1959, Reagan in 1987, and George W. Bush beginning in
2005. Politically weak Presidents often don't get what they want,
whether that's Social Security reform or Harriet Miers on the bench.
Politically strong Presidents do. 2 6 1
III. CONCLUSION
The question about how to construct a usable past matters all the
more because of the normative valence it takes on when described as
"precedent." Kar and Mazzone do not purport simply to describe past
patterns; they add a normative dimension by elevating the pattern
they've discovered to the status of a "historical rule" that they apply to
judge the permissibility of present practice. 262 Likewise, the repeated,
ritualistic accusations of "unprecedented" behavior by the other side in
appointments controversies serve as accusations of misconduct. In these
debates, no one ever uses "unprecedented" in a good way.2 63
This means that a lot of normative work is being done by historical
accounts. And, in particular, a lot of subsumed normative work is being
done by the choices of how to frame those accounts. In Part I of this
Essay, I offered my own description of recent judicial appointments con-
troversies. In Part II, I offered two much longer narrative arcs within
which the more recent events could be situated: one focused on legisla-
tive obstruction and the other on confirmation battles. Just as one could
choose to describe the present in different terms than I have, one could
also situate it within differently constructed and delineated pasts.
The choice among these is a political choice, and therefore the choice
to describe something as unprecedented states a conclusion as much as
it does a premise. This of course does not mean that we should stop
talking about our present politics in terms of the past. But it does mean
that we should be alive as to how political claims about the past are
constructed. In the judicial context, Jerome Frank wryly noted that,
"[s]omehow or other, there are plenty of precedents to go around" in
order to legitimate any particular outcome. 264 The same dynamic of
indeterminacy means that, when seeking to delegitimate any particular
outcome, there are plenty of ways of describing it as "unprecedented" to
261 For a discussion of the ways in which public standing affects the relative power of political
institutions, see CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 15-2 6.
262 See Kar & Mazzone, supra note go, at 6o.
263 Cf David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 931 (2016) ("Claims
about the other side's 'unprecedented' tactics have ethical content in light of the theory of consti-
tutional conventions; they imply an abuse of process or power." (footnote omitted)).
264 FRANK, supra note 2, at 152.
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go around. This is because every claim of unprecedentedness rests on a
particular way of telling the story of what came before. For the claim
to be persuasive (and therefore potentially capable of bearing normative
weight), we must first find the story about the past to be persuasive.
And because of the normative valence of these historical claims, persua-
siveness must entail more than just factual accuracy; it must also entail
the belief that this is the right framing, that the right facts have been
picked out as relevant and worthy of being formed into a narrative.
After all, it was accurate in 2015 to say that no President whose last
name began with 0 had ever been denied a Supreme Court appointment
so that the Senate could hold it open for his successor. But the claim
that there was a precedent applicable to thus-named Presidents is un-
persuasive because we do not generally consider stories about our polit-
ical life that focus on the alphabet to be compelling. Telling a persuasive
story requires thinking about the events of the past in context and con-
structing a narrative with explanatory force. The mere incantation of
unprecedentedness cannot short-circuit that much broader historical
inquiry.
By examining the broad sweep of American history, this Essay has
sought to combat the presentist tendency to take current, familiar ar-
rangements as preordained or natural consequences of hardwired insti-
tutional design. Thinking about what political interactions have pro-
duced what outcomes across time enables us to evaluate how such
interactions in the present are likely to play out. And taking the issues
at a high level of generality - asking about legislative obstruction and
about the relative balance of power between the President and the
Senate in getting nominees confirmed - allows us to think through how
specific procedural tools and mechanisms are used to achieve the ends
of the political actors, rather than getting caught up on those tools and
mechanisms themselves. These narratives of course do not answer still-
live questions on topics such as the future of the legislative filibuster,265
the future of senatorial courtesy,266 or the posture other political actors
may take toward the Court in the future, 267 but they do give us a
broader context in which to situate these questions, as well as some as-
sistance in thinking them through. For those reasons, I find them to be
persuasive accounts of the past for the purpose of understanding recent
controversies over judicial appointments. Within this broad temporal
and substantive frame, it is possible to situate the events of recent
years. Other accounts - ones with narrower temporal or substantive
265 See supra p. iio.; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 30o-ol; Chafetz, supra note III.
266 See supra pp. 97-98; Lydia Wheeler, GOP Talks of Narrowing Blue-Slip' Rule for Judges,
THE HILL (May 20, 2017, 4:29 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/334296-gop-talks-of-
narrowing-blue-slip-rule-for-judges [https://perma.cc/VY6M-QZDB].
267 See Clark, supra note 104, at 743.
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frames - may make recent events appear to be outliers, even unprece-
dented. Political actors describing the moves of their antagonists there-
fore have an incentive to apply a narrower frame - and, as Part I
demonstrated, apply it they do. But that narrower framing also runs
the risk of impoverishing our understanding of American politics and
depriving us of the resources with which to engage the issues of the
present moment.
When confronted with a claim in constitutional politics that some
actor is engaged in unprecedented behavior, then, the first question we
should ask is: Under what framing of the past? And the second question
should then be: Do we find that framing of the past to be helpful? Does
it illuminate more than it obfuscates? If so, we should be willing to
draw conclusions from it. If not, then not. There is, after all, plenty of
precedent for unpersuasive claims of unprecedentedness.
